HOLDER IN DUE COURSE AND RIGHTS AND PRIVIELEGES PROVIDED TO HOLDER IN DUE COURSE UNDER NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT (INDIA)
HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
The phrase ˜Holder in Due Course™ shortens considerable the cumbrous English equivalent ˜bona fide holder for value without notice™; and both the Indian and English Acts have adopted this phrase. Sec. 9 of the Negotiable Instruments Act imposes a more stringent condition on a Holder in Due Course as compared to one under Section 29 (1) (b) of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882. HE must not only have acquired the bill, note or cheque for valid consideration but should have acquired the instrument without having sufficient cause to believe that any defect existed in the title of the person from whom he received the instrument. This condition requires that he should act in good faith and with reasonable caution. However, mere failure to prove bona fides, or absence of negligence on his part would negative his claim.[1]
Section 9 of the Negotiable Instrument deals with the concept of Holder In Due Course. It is essential that a person who claims to be a holder in due course must show that he acquired the instrument for valuable and lawful consideration, but Court can™t look into such lawful and valuable consideration.[2] However, where the bona fides of the transaction is impeached, the extent of the consideration given is a factor that the court will consider in determining the question of bona fides.[3]
Consideration shall be something which not only party regards but the law can regard as having some value.[4] It can be either positive in that, it requires doing of something or negative in that, it requires forbearance.[5] Inadequacy of consideration must be distinguished from the absence or failure of a part of the consideration in which case, the instrument is not valid to that extent between parties in immediate relationship. It is also necessary that the consideration should be lawful under s 2(d), of the Indian Contract Act 1872; past consideration is a good consideration and will support a negotiable instrument. An antecedent debt or liability is sufficient to constitute a valuable consideration for a negotiable instrument.[6] It was formerly thought that an antecedent debt or liability was not a sufficient consideration for a bill payable on demand but this Doctrine was overruled in Currie v. Misa[7] in England. But the antecedent debt or liability must be one due from the maker or negotiator of the instrument and not from a third party. It is only a person who comes into possession of an instrument after having paid consideration for it and being a bona fide transferee that can be holder in due course within the meaning of Sec. 9. Section 9 implies and contemplates that there must be a negotiation or a transfer to the holder in due course by someone who has the authority to transfer the negotiable instrument. The transfer and the negotiation must be of an inchoate instrument, which is not a negotiable instrument under the Act. From the point of view of the proviso to the section, it may also be said that in the case of inchoate document, it would be difficult to hold that the possessor of it is a bona fide transferee or in possession of the negotiable instrument.
The Section talks about the effective possession of an instrument. The section says that the holder must have become the possessor of the instrument before the amount mentioned in it became payable. Therefore, a person who takes a bill or note on the day on which it becomes payable cannot claim the rights of a holder in due course, because he takes it after it becomes payable, as the bill or note can be discharged by payment at any time on that day. There is some difficulty in applying the words ˜before the amount mentioned in it became payable to cheques and demand bills since they are payable immediately. The words ˜before it was overdue™ appearing in Sec. 29(1) of the BE Act are preferable.
In Gopalan v Lakshminarasamma[8] it was held that a demand promissory note is not payable until demand is made. Where an endorsee of a promissory note payable on demand is not aware that the promissory note has been discharged or that any demand was made, he must be deemed to be a holder in due course even if as a matter of fact, the endorsement was made after the discharge.[9] And the rights of such a holder are co-extensive only with those of the immediate transferor.
Under English Law the defendant may have a counterclaim for unliquidated damages arising out of the same transaction is no defense against an action on a bill of exchange. There can be a holder in due course of a post-dated cheque.[10]
It has been held in various decisions of Hon™ble Supreme Court and various High Courts that in such cases the rule of limitation has no application Where a note payable on demand is negotiated it is not deemed to be overdue by reason that it appeared that a reasonable time for presenting it for payment has elapsed since its issue.[11] The question arises as to when did the amount mentioned in the promissory note become payable? And the Hon™ble Court answered it as the promissory note became payable from the moment of execution.[12] No demand is necessary before bringing an action upon a note payable on demand, because its payment is a duty which attaches the moment the loan is given and the note is made. To put the matter differently, the creditor cannot extend the period of limitation by omission to make a demand and time runs against him from the date of the note, on the principle that the cause of action arises instantly on the loan and the contract on the note is in a state of being broken perpetually. Clearly, these principles have no application to a case under section 9 of the Act. The true rule applicable is that where a note payable on demand is negotiated, it is not deemed to be overdue for the purpose of affecting the holder with defects of title of which he had no notice by reason that it appears that a reasonable time for preventing it for payment has elapsed since its issue. If a promissory note payable on demand is after a certain time to be treated as overdue although payment has not been demanded it is no longer a negotiable instrument. But a promissory note payable on demand is intended to be a continuing security; it is quite unlike the case of a cheque which is intended to be presented speedily.[13]
What is the sufficient cause as to the defective title? Under English law, the only question to be considered is whether the holder took the instrument in good faith and, once it is proved that he did so, he is entitled to all the rights of a holder in due course notwithstanding that he was careless, that he made no enquiry, and that he was informed of facts which would have led a reasonable man to make further inquiry, provided, however, that he had no notice of any defect in the transferor™s title.
Under sec. 90 of the BE Act it is not necessary that a holder should have actual knowledge of what the particular wrong was, and if he, suspecting that there is something wrong, avoids inquiry, lest he should come to know of any defect in the title, he cannot be deemed to be acting honestly. It has been held in the case of Raphael v Bank of England[14] that it is immaterial whether at the time of taking the instrument, hewas negligent or not.
The Indian law is stricter and requires a higher degree of diligence from the person who claims to be a holder in due course than in England. Under Indian Law, Privy Council has held that the defective title of the transferor would not attach to the transferee merely because of the latter™s negligence. Even the legislature seems to have intended to make due care and caution on the part of the holder, a test of his bona fides and that mere good faith on his part would not suffice. Accordingly, it seems negligence on the part of a holder at the time of taking a negotiable instrument, would disentitle him to the rights of a holder in due course. Under the Indian law, it is not enough to show that the holder acquired the instrument honestly, if in fact, he was negligent or careless. The Negotiable Instruments Act follows the English rule laid down by Lord Tenterden in Gill v Cubitt[15] according to which due care and caution were made the tests of bona fides. The stricter rule of Indian law makes it difficult for dishonest transferors to partwith negotiable instruments, and honest transferors will not suffer from it, as they have no real difficulty in persuading the transferees to take the instrument as their title is good, but the law should be framed not only for the purpose of putting difficulties in the way of dishonest brokers, but also to protect people who acting honestly take such instruments for value; for otherwise, the rapidity with which the commercial business is transacted will be seriously impeded and the very object of negotiable instruments will be defeated.
Notice of Defects:
If, at the time when the holder acquires his title as such, he has sufficient notice that a defect exists in the title of his transferor, he is not a holder in due course. Notice means knowledge of the facts or a suspicion that something is wrong combined with a willful disregard of the means of knowledge. Notice of defects may be either actual or constructive. Proof of such notice may be given by evidence that the transferee received actual notice, or that he was made aware of facts from which knowledge of such defect may reasonably be inferred.[16] Notice and knowledge mean not merely express notice but also knowledge or the means of knowledge to which the party willfully shuts his eyes and a suspicion in the mind of party and means of knowledge in his power willfully disregarded. Notice affecting the holder in taking a negotiable instrument must exist at the time when he acquires the paper for then it is that his relation to the bill is fixed, and subsequent notice will not affect his right to sue upon it. If a note is retransferred to a former holder in due course, he is not deprived of his original rights, although on the second occasion he takes with knowledge of defects or after maturity. However, where a former holder has participated in the fraud or illegality affecting the instrument or is not originally a holder in due course, he cannot by the repurchase of the note from such a holder acquire his immunities, but the note is subject to the same equities if it had never been in the hands of an innocent holder, and a re-transfer by him after maturity to a former holder in due course does not reinvest the transferee with that status. Actual knowledge of defects or of equities precludes a transferee from attaining the position of a holder in due course although he paid the full value for the instrument.
RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
Privilege against Inchoate Stamped Instruments [S. 20]:
The logical order of operations with regard to a bill is, no doubt, that the bill should be first riled up, then it should be signed by the drawer, then it should be accepted, then it should be negotiated, and then it should be indorsed by the persons who become successively holders; but it is common knowledge that parties very often vary, in a most substantial manner, the logical order of those proceedings, and Section 20 is intended to deal with those cases. In order, however, to bring this section into operation the following conditions must be fulfilled. In the first place, it is of the very essence of this liability that the defendant should have signed the blank instrument and voluntarily parted with it with the intention that it should be filled up and is used as such.
When the holder exceeds the authority in filling up the blank, he can of course no benefit from it and American decisions go to the length of holding that his act is an utter nullity and no advantage can accrue to him even to the extent of the authority given to him.[17] Under the proviso to the section, the holder in such a case is entitled to recover the sum which was originally intended to be paid. As to a bona fide holder, the question as to the effect of the acceptance or indorsement having been written on a blank piece of paper can be of no importance unless he can be fastened with notice of the imperfection; he can be fastened with the notice of that imperfection. If the holder has a notice of the imperfection, he can be in no better situation that the person who took it in blank as to any right against the acceptor or endorser who gave it in blank.[18] Especially it is the case when the person takes the bill in an incomplete form, for he cannot be bona fide holder for value as he has taken a piece of blank paper and not a bill[19], and he can take it as a bill only under the authority given to his transferor. In that case, if he does not satisfy himself as to the extent of the authority of the person transferring the bill, he acts at his peril.[20] But a bill cannot be said to be incomplete and irregular simply because it was not accepted at that time it was negotiated to the holder.[21] It is only a bona fide holder for value that is protected, so that if the holder had taken the bills for betting transactions and realized the amount, the maker is entitled to recover the amount.[22] There is in that case no presumption in his favor.[23] But, as to a bona fide holder for value he is absolutely protected and he is entitled to recover though the amount for which it was intended to be issued is materially altered[24] or even if the instrument is fraudulently used for a purpose other than the purpose for which it was intended.[25] To entitle a person to the rights of a holder in due course the instrument must have been completed before it was negotiated to him.
It is to be noticed that the authority to fill up is given only to a holder of an instrument, so an agent of the person issuing the instrument under the section does not come within the purview of this section; his authority will be regulated by the general law applicable to such authority.[26] In England, it was once doubted whether the protection in favor of a holder in due course applies to a person who is first holder of the instrument and in the point of the fact, to the payee,[27] that is to say, whether can be a payee in due course.[28] But the question is settled and a payee is not a holder in due course. It is only a person who takes an instrument which is regular and complete on its face who can be a holder in due course. In Indian law there is no room for controversy, as under section 9 of the Act; ˜payee™ is included in the definition of holder in due course. However, it should be noted that a holder of an inchoate instrument cannot become a holder in due course by making himself the payee. To be a holder in due course he must come into possession of a negotiable instrument and not an inchoate instrument. The authority conferred upon a holder of an inchoate document under this section if to complete the document and nothing more and by exercising the authority it can be said that there is negotiation or transfer in his favor of a negotiable instrument.[29]
Liability of prior parties (s. 36):
The holder in due course of an instrument is entitled to maintain an action thereon in his own name against all the prior parties to the instrument. However, in the event of dishonor, the holder is not bound to sue all the prior parties liable to him under the instrument and he may, at his option, select the parties he wants to recover his amount from.
The expression prior party in the section means the maker or drawer, the acceptor, and all the intervening endorsees. Every prior party continues to remain liable on the instrument to every subsequent party, and to a holder in due course, until the instrument is duly satisfied.[30] An instrument is deemed to be fully satisfied if the liability of all the parties is extinguished, and the instrument is discharged by payment or satisfaction thereof by the maker or acceptor before its maturity. An instrument is not discharged by payment by the maker or the acceptor before its maturity. Where an acceptor of a bill pays and takes up the instrument before maturity, he can reissue and further negotiate it, though he has no right to enforce payment on it against any intervening party to whom he was previously liable.[31]
The comparison of s 35 and s 36 would show that while s 35 subjects to liability in any contract to the contrary, s 36 has no such qualifying phrase and a holder in due course of a bill or note may recover the amount due on the instrument notwithstanding the existence of facts and circumstances attacking the validity of the transaction between the prior parties even including want of consideration.
Acceptor cannot plead against a holder in due course that the bill is drawn in a fictitious name (Sec 42):
Under the English Law, on the principle that acceptor is bound to know the signature of his correspondent, i.e., the drawer, the acceptor is estopped from denying the signature of the drawer, but under Indian Law there is no such estoppel against the acceptor.[32] Even in England, this rule of estoppels does not apply to the case where a bill is drawn to the drawer™s order and indorsed by him, in which case, the acceptor though he cannot deny the signature of the drawer, may still question the genuineness of his signature as indorser.[33] In one case a contrary view was taken[34] but Byles points out in his book on Bills of Exchange, 24th Ed, P. 167 that clearly the acceptor is not estopped disputing the validity and genuineness of the indorsement , as distinguished from the drawer™s then capacity to indorse.
The section reproduces the rule of English Common Law on the subject that:
[w]here a bill is drawn in the name of a fictitious person payable to the order of the drawer, the acceptor is considered as undertaking to pay to the order of the person who signed as the drawer; and therefore, an indorsee may bring evidence to show that the signature of the supposed drawer of the bill and to the first indorsement are in the same handwriting.[35]
When a bill is drawn payable to the order of the drawer, the drawer is also the payee of the bill. The expression, a bill of exchange drawn in a fictitious name and payable to the order, therefore, means that both the drawer and the payee are fictitious person. According to Lord Herschell:
Whenever the name inserted as that of the payee is so inserted by way of pretence merely, without any intention that payment shall only be made in conformity therewith, the payee is a fictitious person¦whether the name be that of an existing person, or of the one who has no existence.[36]
Before the Bills of Exchange Act, the law in England was that the acceptor was liable only if he was aware of the fictitious character of the payee at the time of acceptance.[37] The law has since been altered by the Act, by which it is provided that such bills may be treated as bills payable to the bearer.[38] Now, in England, an acceptor is not relieved from liability if the payee is fictitious, whether the fact was known to him or not. The Indian Act does no throw any light on this point. If the acceptor knows of the fictitious character of the payee, the case is not any worse than that contemplated in section 41, ante. Moreover, if he accepts the instrument with such knowledge, he perpetuates a fraud on third parties and he cannot escape liability by showing his own fraud. If the acceptor has no such knowledge at the time of acceptance, lead to the conclusion that he is liable. But it is to be noticed that under section 121 of this Act, it is doubtful whether the acceptor is estopped from denying the existence of a payee.
It is observed that only a holder in due course can recover in an instrument in which the drawer or payee is fictitious, this is so, because the law abhors the fraud, and discountenances any instrument whereby fraud can be committed. They are never enforced, save in the hands if a holder in due course, is entitled to recover. At any rate, under this section, the acceptor is liable only to a holder in due course.
The other parties liable to pay cannot plead that the delivery of the instrument was conditional or for a specific purpose only (Sec 46):
Under the section, it may be shown that the instrument was delivered for some specific purpose.[39] Thus, if a holder indorses a bill to another specially for getting it discounted, and if such other person indorses the bill in breach of trust, the indorsee, if not a holder in due course cannot sue the original indorser, or any other prior party, as they can set up the defense of the breach of trust of the original indorsee, and can plead that there was no delivery with intent to pass absolute title.[40] In the same way, one of two persons jointly interested in a bill indorses it to another for collection in the joint account the latter cannot sue the former on the indorsement.[41] The maker of a note may show in a suit between him and the payee that he executed the note as collateral security for a running account and that the state of account at that time was in his favor[42], or that the promissory notes sued on was executed and delivered only as security for the payment of future installments to a chit fund[43], or that the note was intended to as additional security for advances made on the security of goods, in case the latter proved insufficient[44] or for collection only[45]. Moreover, if the person to him the instrument was delivered conditionally or for a special purpose, misappropriates it, the true owner can recover the amount if already realized, from him or from any other person taking it from him with notice of the conversion.[46]
It is to be noticed that these defenses are available as between such parties and any holder of the instrument other than a holder in due course. The words are ambiguous, which ambiguity has been avoided in the English Bills of Exchange Act, section21, by using the words as between immediate parties and as regards a remote party, other than a holder in due course. Having regard to the fact that the two Acts were drafted by the same person, viz., Sir Mackenize Chalmers, and that no difference in law could have been intended, it has been decided in Allahabad High Court[47] that the true meaning of the words is between the maker and the payee or the indoser and the indorsee or the indorsee and any other than a holder in due course, or as between any of such parties and any other. Of course, as will be seen, the holder in due course is always protected against such defenses.
He gets a good title to the instrument even though the title of the transferor or any price party to the instrument is defective (Sec 53) He can recover the full amount unless he was a party to fraud; or if the instrument is negotiated by means of a forged endorsement:
The rule laid down in the section is subject to a qualification. That qualification is especially enacted in the Bills of Exchange Act[48] and though the Indian Act is silent on this point, the courts in India would hold the qualification as applicable to the cases arising in India also. If the holder who derives his title from a holder in due course is himself a party to the fraud or illegally affecting the instrument, he cannot claim the rights thereon of a holder in due course. Courts will not help a party to reap the advantage of his own fraud. If he were a party to any fraud or illegality, he does not acquire the rights and privileges of a holder in due course.
A holder deriving title from a holder in due course, stands in his shoes, and can sue the acceptor, drawer, and all prior parties whom the holder in due course himself could have sued. However, it is not necessary that the holder with a derivative title should have been given consideration for the instrument.[49] Thus a person to whom a holder in due course has transferred a bill for collection can maintain a suit upon the bill in his own name as he is a holder deriving title from the holder in due course and is component to sue under the section.[50]
The person liable cannot plead against the holder in due course that the instrument had been lost or was obtained by means of an offence of fraud or for an unlawful consideration (Sec 58):
The general rule is, as between immediate parties, the defendant may set up any defense which he might have set up if the action had been brought on any simple contract. A defense may be as such it relates to the instrument itself, in which case it is good even as against a holder in due course. For example, absolute incapacity of the defendant to make a contract, forgery of parties to a signature, absence of effective delivery- any of these may be pleaded as defense is complicated by any defense against any person except in cases where such defense is complicated by any question of estoppels. But the equity must be one attaching to the bill itself and not to any claim arising out of the collateral matters, such as the right of set off[51], though it seems that by agreement it may be so.[52] An agreement to credit certain amounts towards a bill can by subsequent agreement before attached to the bill so as to affect a holder not in due course. The plea of fraud in the obtaining of the instrument is good only against immediate parties but not against a holder in due course, except in cases similar to Foster v Mackinnon.[53] Again, the defense that the instrument had been negotiated in breach of an agreement to use it for a particular purpose only cannot be pleaded against a holder in due course. In such cases, when once it is proved that there has been a breach of faith and fraud it is on the holder to prove that he gave value for the note in good faith. Thus, where a bill is fraudulently negotiated instead of being discounted as agreed upon,[54] or where a partner accepts a bill in the firm™s name in fraud of the other partners,[55] the holder is not protected, unless he proves that he was a holder of a bill given under undue influence may be restrained from negotiating the same, if he was a person who had notice of the fact.[56]
The validity of the instrument as originally made or drawn cannot be denied by the maker of drawer of a negotiable instrument or by acceptor of a bill of exchange for honor of the drawer (Sec 120):
The section precludes the maker of a note, the drawer of a bill or cheque, and the acceptor for the honor of the drawer from denying the validity of the instrument as originally drawn. The maker and the drawer, by their respective agreements, are directly responsible for bringing these documents in existence, and so they should not be allowed to plead that the instrument, as originally made or drawn by them, was not valid. Similarly, an acceptor for the honor of the drawer is bound by all estoppels, which bind the drawer, and he is not permitted to deny the validity of the bill as originally drawn. However, validity of the instrument is different from proving instrument itself, in accordance with law. Though s 120 makes it clear that no maker of a promissory note or a drawer of a bill of exchange or cheque be permitted to deny validity of instruments are admitted to be executed.[57] Therefore, in a suit by a holder is due course on a bill or note, the defendant is not, under the section precluded from setting up the plea that he never drew or made the instrument and that his name on it had been forged. A person is not precluded under the section from denying the validity if the note on the ground that he was a minor as on the date of the note, as the specific provision in s 120 is subject to the general rule enacted in s 26.[58] The ordinary acceptor of a bill is not mentioned in the section. By virtue of s 117 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872, it is enacted that no acceptor of a bill of exchange shall be permitted to deny that the drawer had authority to draw or indorse the bill. The acceptor of a bill may, however, deny that the bill was really drawn by the person by whom it purports to have been drawn.
The present section is wider than the section of the Evidence Act; for the estoppel under this section precludes the drawer and acceptor for the honor of the drawer from denying the validity of the instrument as originally drawn. Any circumstances which will vitiate the contract between the original parties to the bill cannot be set up by person mentioned in the section such as fraud, want of consideration, coercion etc. He cannot deny the existence of the payee or his then capacity to indorse,[59] but it has been held that in a suit by the payee on a promissory note which offends against the Paper Currency Act and which is therefore on the face of it illegal, the maker is not estopped from setting up the illegality of the instrument since the payee under such a promissory note cannot be said to be a holder in due course,[60] and before a person can be allowed to rely on the provisions of this section, he has to show that he is a holder in due course.[61]
The maker of a note or an acceptor of a bill payable to order cannot deny the payee™s capacity to indorse the same at the date of the note or bill (sec 121):
By the very act of making a promissory note, the maker engages to pay the amount to the payee named in the instrument, and thus acknowledges the capacity of the payee to receive the money, and if the note be drawn payable to the order of a specified person, he admits the capacity of that person to make the order for the payment of money. So, he cannot say in a suit by a holder in due course that the payee was a corporation without legal exercise. The same rule applies in the case of an acceptor to a bill of exchange. By this act of acceptance, he admits everything essential to the validity of the existence of the negotiable instrument; and one of such essentials is the capacity of the payee named in the instrument to receive the money to be paid by an indorsement on the bill.[62] An acceptor is not allowed to show, when sued by a holder in due course, that the payee was an infant,[63] or that the drawers of a bill drawn payable to their own order were infant,[64] and again the maker of a note is estopped from showing that the payee of a bill was insolvent incapable of indorsing the instrument,[65] nor can the acceptor be allowed to plead that the payee was a married woman incapable of contracting.[66]
But the case may be different if the insolvency or the insanity happened after the making of the note or the indorsing of the bill; for in such cases, the indorsement by such a person is a mere nullity and can confer no title on the indorsee, and acceptor is not justified in making payement to anyone whose title is affected by it.[67]
Endorser is not permitted as against the holder in due course to deny the signature or capacity to contract of any prior party to the instrument (Sec 122) :
The indorser engages that the bill or note is a valid and subsisting obligation binding on all parties according to their position on the instrument; and he further represents to his indorsee that he has a good and valid title to the instrument and he has a right to transfer the same.
To sustain his title to the instrument, he admits the genuineness of the prior indorsements and represents that the signature of not only the drawer but also of the acceptor and those of the indorser through whom he drives his title are genuine. The indorser admits not only the genuineness of the signatures but also the capacity of all prior parties. The indorser contracts that the original parties to the bill or note were competent to bind themselves whether as drawer, acceptor or maker, as also that the indoser were competent to contract as indorsers and to indorse the instrument.[68] The indorsee takes the bill or note chiefly on the credit of the indorser, and the indorser is not allowed to deny the fact that the goes to make up his title and the right of the recovery against the persons who became parties to the instrument. So if the indorser™s title was tainted by the forgery of an indorsement prior to his own, he is still bound on his indorsement to his indorsee, though he is not aware of the forgery committed.[69] The section does not, however prevent the indorser from denying the validity of the instrument, for example, that the hundi was one payable to bearer on demand as offering section 26 of the Paper Currency Act, now under the Reserve Bank Act and hence invalid.[70]
The plaintiff only needs to prove that the indorsement made in his favor is true and valid and he paid valid consideration for the same and he became the possessor of the instrument before the amount mentioned in it became payable and that he believed that no defect existed in the title of the assignor.
The plaintiff being holder in due course is entitled to the privilege conferred on him by the statute. So by virtue of provisions 120 to 122 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, the dismissal of the suit is illegal and unsuitable in law. The appellant plaintiff has satisfactorily proved the endorsement in his favor and he became the holder in due course. The instrument once reaching the hands of a holder in due course is cleansed of all defects. It becomes pure and passes also to subsequent parties as an instrument immune from any defect. However, where holder in due course himself is a party to fraud or illegality he does not acquire the rights of a holder in due course.
[1] U Ponnappa Moothan Sons v Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd AIR 1991 SC 441.
[2] Muthu Karuppa v Habib, AIR 1955 Mad. 43
[3] Jones v Gordon, (1877) 2 App. Cas. 616, cited from Supra Note 23 at 61
[4] Supra Note 1 at 144
[5] Chidambram v Ranga, AIR 1966 SC 193
[6] Indian Bank v K. Nataraja (1994) 79 Comp Cas 674.
[7] (1875) 10 Ex 153.
[8] AIR 1940 Mad 631.
[9] Profulla Kumar v Harichandra, AIR 1956 Ori. 85.
[10] Montechhi v Shimco (U.K.) Ltd., (1980) 1 Lloyd™s Rep. 50 cited from Supra Note 23 at 63.
[11] Shaha & Co. v Bengal National Bank Ltd., 47 Cal. 861 cited from Supra Note 1 at 152.
[12] Brojindra Kishore v Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society, 44 Cal. 978.
[13] Brooks v Mitchell (1841) 9 M&W 15 . Same view was held in plethora of decisions startingfrom Brough v White, (1837) 2 N and W 461; Glasscock v Balls (1894) 24 QBD 13; Norton v Ella;, Rowe v Young.
[14] (1885) 17 CB 161.
[15] (1824) 3 B&C 466 cited from Ibid.
[16] Muthis Chetty v. Kasivasi Somasundara, (1911) 10 MLT 79 cited from Supra note 23 at 67.
[17] Daniel, 6th Edition, para 147; Leelavathi v Durairaj (1978) 2 MLJ 459.
[18] Hatch v Searles (1854) 2 Sm &G 147.
[19] Goldsmid v Hampton(1858) 5 CB (NS)94.
[20] Awde v Dixon (1851) 6Ex 869.
[21] National Park Bank of New York v Berggren Co. & Beven (1914) 110 Lt 907.
[22] Paine v Bevan (1914)110 LT 933.
[23] Hogarth v Latham & Co (1878) 3 QBD 643.
[24] Garrard v Lewis (1882) 10 QBD 30.
[25] Guildford Trust Ltd v Gross (1927) 136 LT 725.
[26] Smith v Prosser (1907) 2 KB 735 (CA).
[27] Herdman v Wheeler (1902) 1 KB 361.
[28] Jone v Warring and Gillow (1926) AC 670.
[29] Tarachand v Sikri Brothers AIR 1953 Bom 290.
[30] Radha Rukmani Ammal v Swaminacha Mudalier Sons and Co and anor (M/s)(2003)2 Bank CLR 552 (Mad).
[31] Burbridge v Manners (1812) 5 Camp 184; Hubbard v Jackson (1827) 4 Bing 390.
[32] Indian Evidence Act, Section 117.
[33] Beeman v Duck (1843) 11 M & W 251; Byles, 24th Edition, page 166.
[34] Tucker v Roberts (1894) 18 LJQB 169.
[35] Cooper v Mayer (1820) 10 B&C 468.
[36] Bank of England v Vagliano Bros (1891) AC107.
[37] Gibosn v Minet (1791) I H Bla 569.
[38] Bills of Exchange Act, Section 7.
[39] North and South Wales Bank v Macbeth (1908) AC 137.
[40] Lloyd v Howard (1850) 15 QB 995.
[41] Denton v Peters (1870) LR 5 QB 475, following Sattamuthu v Abdul Kareem AIR 1933 Mad 61.
[42] Sundaram v Damodaram AIR 1924 Mad 850.
[43] Elappa v Sesha 1938 Mad 897.
[44] Bhogi Ram v Kishori Lal AIR 1928 All 289.
[45] Khir Mohammad v Taj AIR (1936) Pesh 181.
[46] Mutty Loll v Launcelot Dent 5 MIA 328.
[47] Bhigi Ram v Kishori Lal AIR 1928 All 289.
[48] Bills of Exchange Act, Section 29 clause (3); Robinson v Reynolds (1841) 2 QB 196.
[49] Subrao v Sitaram (1900) Bom LR 891.
[50] Ardeshir v Khushaldas (1908) 10 Bom LR 268.
[51] In re Overend Gurney & Co (1868) LR 6 Eq 344; Whitehead v Walker (1842) 10 M &W 696.
[52] Holmes v Kidd (1858) 28LJ Ex 112; Ramamurthi v Nukoyya AIR 1942 Mad 30.
[53] (1869) LR 4 CP 704.
[54] Smith v Braine (1851) 16 QB 241.
[55] Hogg v Skeen (1865) 18 CB (NS) 426.
[56] Edwards v Dick (1821) 4 B & ALD 212.
[57] Saftarasab v B Alliah (2006)2 Bank CLR 418 (Kant).
[58] Chengal Roya v Nainappa (1938) 177 IC 133.
[59] Bills of Exchange Act, section 55, clause (b).
[60] Pethu v Chidambara AIR 1931 Mad 533.
[61] Raza Ali v Rahat Hussain AIR 1933 All 754.
[62] Bills of Exchange Act, section 55, clause (2).
[63] Jones v Dorah (1817) 4 Price 300.
[64] Taylor v Croker (1802) 4 Esp 186.
[65] Drayton v Dale (1823) 2 B & C 293.
[66] Smith v Marsack (1848) 6 CB 486.
[67] Alcock v Alcock (1841) 3 M & Gr 268.
[68] McGregor v Rhodes (1856) 6 E & B 266.
[69] Bishen Chand v Rajendro 5 All 302.
[70] Arunchalam v Narayanam 42 Mad 470 per Seshgiri Iyer, J.
